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by 
Leora Harpaz, Professor, Western New England College School of Law, 
Springfield, Massachusetts 
Controversies arising over the extent of the First Amendment speech rights of public 
school students while at school are resolved by an analysis of the familiar quartet of major 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court: Tinker,' Fraser,2 Kuhlmeier,3 and Morse.4 
While these decisions have not removed all uncertainty over the scope of student speech 
rights, they at least have divided these cases into distinct categories and identified the 
standard to be applied within each category. For example, if a student engages in personal, 
political expression in the school setting, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School EJi,strict requires the school administration to justifY discipline of the student by 
showing that the speech created "substantial disruption of or material interference with 
. school activities.'" However, if a student's speech occurs as part of a school-sponsored 
expressive activity, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier allows the school to censor the 
speech if it demonstrates "legitimate pedagogical concerus,"· a less demanding standard 
than Tinker's substantial disruption test. 
By contrast to speech in the school setting, the Supreme Court has said nothing defini-
tive on the subject of speech by public school students that occurs away ifrom school. In 
the Court's most recent school speech decision, Morse v. Frederick,7 the speech at issue 
occurred outside the school building, but was characterized as part of a school-sponsored 
activity, similar to a school trip. Under these circumstances, the speech could be treated as 
though it had occurred at school since the students were still under the control of school 
• Copyright © 2009 Leora Harpaz. All rights reserved. Reprinted by pennission. 
I Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (overturning discipline of 
students for wearing black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War). 
2 Bethel Sch. Dis!. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (pennitting school to discipline student for 
sexually suggestive speech at school assembly). 
3 Hazelwood Sch. Dis!. v. Kuhhneier; 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (llphoiding ceusorship of school newspaper 
by high school principal). 
4 Morse v. Frederick, 127 Sup. Ct 2618 (2007) (allowing school to discipline studeot for speech reason-
ably perceived as advocating illegal drug use in light of school's strong anti-drug policy). 
5 Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, 514. 
6 Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273. 
7 127 Sup. C!. 2618 (2007). 
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authorities.8 The Court made clear in Morse that "the outer boundaries" of the "school-
speech precedents" were uncertain and that it was not resolving the issue of how similar 
off-campus speech would be treated outside the context of a school-sponsored, school-
supervised activity? 
By contrast with student speech rights, it has long been established that schools can 
control the non-speech behavior of students outside the school setting in some circum-
stances. 'O The theory of in loco parentis justifies this broad ranging school authority, at 
least where fundamental rights are not involved. For example, in Clements v. Board of 
Trustees of Sheridan County School District No.2," a state court upheld the discipline of 
a student for driving so as to endanger students on a school bus even though the behavior 
took place on a highway. The rationale of the opinion was that the conduct had "a direct 
and immediate effect on the discipline or general welfare of the school." 12 
The absence of clear judicial authority on the rights of public schools to discipline 
studelJls for protected speech 13 that occurs away from school has led to a wide range of 
judicial opinions on this issue. Thirty years ago in Thomas v. Board of Education, Gran-
ville Central School District,'4 the Second Circuit adopted a speech protective approach, 
limiting school authority to the punishment of on-campus speech and concluding that "the 
student is free to speak his mind when the school qay ends."1S 
, ld at 2624 ("Cnder these circumstances, we agree with the superintendent that Frederick cannot 'stand , 
in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim he is not 
at school. "'). 
9 !d. ("There is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts should apply school-speech 
precedents, but not on these facts.") (citation omitted). 
10 E.g., Hutton v. State, 5 S.w. 122, 123 (Tex. App. 1887) ('That the punishment was inflicted for an 
infraction of a rule of the school, which infraction was committed away from the school house, and not during 
school hours, did not deprive the teacher of the legal right to punish the pupil for such infraction."). 
II 585 P.2d 197 (Wyo. 1978). 
12 ld at 204-05 ("It matters little that the prosclibed conduct occurred on a public highway. It is gener-
ally accepted that school authorities may discipline pupils for out-of-school conduct having a direct and im-
mediate effect on the discipline or general welfare of the school. This is particularly true where the discipline 
is reasonably necessary for the student's physical or emotional safety and well-being of other students, teach-
ers or public school property.") (citations omitted). 
13 If the speech at issue falls within one of the unprotected categories of speech, such as a true threat or 
fighting words, it is not protected by the First Amendment and can be punished if it occurs off-campus on the 
same basis as nonspeech conduct. 
14 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979). 
15 ld at 1052. See also Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F .3d 608 (5'" Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 
544 U.S. \062 (2005) (refusing to apply the Tinker standard to a violent drawing made by a student off-
campus and brought to campus without his knowledge two years later, and finding that the on-campus speech 
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The Thomas decision is the high water mark for the protection of off-campus student 
speech with most other courts recognizing some authority to discipline students for such 
speech. Many courts conclude that the authority of the school extends beyond speech that 
occurs at school so long as there is some "appropriate nexus"l. between the speech and the 
school. The easiest of these cases involve hybrid situations where the speech originates 
away from school, but reaches the school with the knowledge and consent of the student 
who authored the speech, such as the in-school distribution of an underground student 
newspaper written away from school,17 or a website shown to other students by its student 
creator while he was at school. 18 
A number of courts have addressed the issue of how to categorize the speech if it origi-
nated off-campus, but made its way onto campus by the actions of others. Some courts 
ignore the issue of who is responsible for the speech reaching campus, thus classifying 
such cases as identical to cases where the speaker brings the speech to campus, while oth-
ers find this distinction relevant to the degree of protection offered the speech. In Beussink 
v. Woodland R-/V School District, 19 a student was disciplined for creating a webpage that 
was critical of the administration at the high school he attended. In deciding to grant a pre-
liminary injunction requested by the student, the court applied the Tinker test and ruled for 
the student based on the absence of disruption.20 In reaching its decision, the court did not 
even discuss the fact that the speech at issue had belln composed off-campus and that the 
student author had taken no steps to bring it to campus; 
By contrast to Beussink, in Killion v. Franklin Regional School District,21 the court con-
• 
sidered the on-campus/off-campus distinction in analyzing the case. In Killion, a student 
distributed a derogatory top-ten list about the school athletic director via e-mail. Copies of 
the list were brought to school and left in the teacher's lounge by an unidentified person 
and the student who composed the e-mail was suspended. In reviewing the suspension, the 
court applied the Tinker standard and concluded that the list had not caused disruption at 
the school. 22 Recognizing some limit on the authority of school officials based on the fact 
16 Layshock v. Hennitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 599 (W.D. Pa. 2007). 
17 See, e.g., Boucherv. Sch. Bd. ofSch. Oist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821,827-28 (7th Cir. 1998) (court 
applied the Tinker test to uphold discipline of stodent for writing article about how to hack into school's com-
puters that was publisbed in an underground newspaper written and published off-campus, but distributed at 
scbool). See also Donovan v. Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14 (I" Cir. 1995). 
18 See, e.g., 1.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Oist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002) (finding that "there is a 
sufficient nexus between the web site and the school campus to consider the speech as occurring on-campus" 
based on the fact that the student had shown the site to another student and accessed it while at school and re-
lying on that nexus to justify upholding the school's actions based on both the Fraser and Tinker standards). 
19 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.O. Mo. 1998). 
20 ld. at 1180. 
21 136 F. Supp. 2d446 (W.O. Pa. 2001). 
22 ld. at 455. 
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that the list was composed away from school and not in connection with a school activity, 
the court refused to apply the Fraser standard despite the fact that the list could be classi-
fied as lewd.23 
Courts have upheld discipline of students for speech that occurs away from school even 
in situations where the speech is never viewed within the school. Typically, discipline is 
only justified in such cases if the off-campus speech has some on-campus impact. In Klein 
v. Smith,24 a student encountered one of his teachers in a restaurant parking lot and gave him 
the finger. The student was suspended for violating a school rule that prohibited "vulgar 
or extremely inappropriate language or conduct directed to a staff member."2' The United 
States District Court for the District of Maine overturned the suspension on the ground that 
the relationship between the student's gesture and the school was "too attenuated."26 How-
ever, in Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the Weedsport Central School District,>7 the 
Second Circuit recently applied the Tinker test to uphold the authority of a school district to 
discipline a student for using a violent icon with accompanying threatening text directed at 
a te!ij:her as part of an instant message sent to the student's buddy list based on its potential 
for disruption rather than based on any evidence of an on-campus effect.2' 
The number of cases addressing the issue of student speech away from school remained 
small until the advent of the Internet. The Intern~t's ability to break down traditional geo-
graphic concepts and be everywhere and nowhere at once brought a reconsideration of the 
traditional on-campus, off-campus divide. Speech that is created off-campus is now seen as 
impacting the school environment with increasing frequency. Internet tools such as social 
• networking sites create off-campus communities of students that miqor conversations at 
23 Id. at 457 ("Although we agree that several passages from the list are lewd, abusive, and derogatory, 
we cannot ignore the fact that the relevant speech, like that in Klein and Thomas, occurred within the confines 
of Paul's home, far removed from any school premises or facilities. Further, Paul was not engaged in any 
school activity or associated in any way with his role as a student when he compiled the Bozzuto Top Ten 
lis!."). 
24 635 F. Supp. 1440 (D. Me. 1986). 
25 Id. at 1441. 
26 Id. But see Fenton v. Stear,423 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1976). The court in Klein also rejected several 
arguments that the gesture should not be considered protected expression under the First Amendment. If 
the speech was unprotected, the school could have punished the student for off-campus conduct free of First 
Amendment constraints. 
27 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007), cal. denied, 128 Sup. Ct. 1741 (2008). 
28 Id. at 40-41 ("[I]t was reasonably foreseeable that the 1M icon would come to the attention of school 
authorities and the teacher whom the icon depicted as being shot. The potentially threatening content of 
the icon and the extensive distributi()n of it, which encompassed 15 recipients, including some of Aaron's 
classmates, during a three-week circulation period, made this risk at least foreseeable to a reasonable person, 
if not inevitable. And there can be no doubt that the icon, once made known to the teacher and other school 
officials, would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment.") (footnote 
omitted). In Wisniewski, the court found it unnecessary to consider whether the icon could be classified as a 
true threat.Id. at 37-38. 
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lunch tables in the school cafeteria and broadcast those previously private conversations to 
a broader audience and with a higher degree of permanence. While online speech is quite 
impermanent because of how easily it can be altered or replaced, from the point of view of 
school authorities it seems all too indelible. 
When these disputes wind up in court, courts increasingly find justifications for allow-
ing public schools to discipline students for speech that occurs away from school. How-
ever, courts are also cognizant of the differences between student speech at school and 
speech away from school. One recent example of this delicate balancing act is found in the 
Second Circuit's decision in Doninger v. Niehoff?9 In Doninger, a student wrote a posting 
on a blog that was highly critical of the school principal and contained disrespectful lan-
guage including calling school administrators "doucebags. "30 While the court concluded 
that the student's speech could have been punished under the Fraser standard if it had oc-
curred at school, it was reluctant to conclude that Fraser applied to off-campus speech and 
did not decide that issue. Instead, it evaluated the speech under the Tinker test and found 
that the"speech '''foreseeably create[ d] a risk of substantial disruption within the school 
enviromnent. "'31 While recognizing that the issue of whether schools are permitted to dis-
cipline students for off-campus speech is unresolved, the court pointed out that '''territori-
ality is not necessarily a useful concept in determining the limit of [school administrators'] 
authority. '''32 
While many courts take a similar approach to Doninger and permit discipline for off-
campus online speech only if the school can satisfy the Tinker standard, there are exceptions , 
to this middle ground approach. In J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, 33 the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania preferred a less speech protective ap-
proach. The court upheld the suspension of a student for using her home computer to create 
a fake MySpace profile of her school principal that portrayed him as "a pedophile and a 
sex addict."34 Despite the fact that the court found that the degree of disruption caused by 
the profile did not satisfy Tinker, it nevertheless upheld the s,uspension based on its view 
29 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). 
30 Jd at 45. 
31 Jd at 50 (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd. ofEduc. of the Weedsport Central Sch. Dis!., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d 
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 Sup. C!. 1741 (2008». 
32 Jd at 48-49 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1058 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., 
concurring in the result». The district court on remand in Doninger recently granted summary judgment for 
the school district as to all but one of the claims in the case. Doninger v. Niehoff, No. 3:07CV1129 (MRK), 
2009 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 2704 (D. Conn. January 9, 2009). It allowed the case to continue on a claim that the 
school district violated the First Amendment by denying students permission to wear "Team Avery" I-shirts 
to protest the principal's decision to disqualify Ms. Doninger from running for senior class secretary. 
33 No. 3:07cv585, 2008 U.s. Dis!. LEXIS 72685 (M.D. Pa. September 11,2008). 
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that the speech could be regulated under Fraser and Morse. 35 Even though the speech took 
place off-campus, the court concluded it was sufficiently connected to the school to punish 
the speech using the same standards that would apply to on-campus speech.'· 
The wide range of judicial views on the issue of when student off-campus speech can 
be the basis of discipline by school authorities makes it difficult for schools to develop 
sound policies to address this situation. Until a more definitive answer is provided by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, schools face this issue without clear judicial guidance. 
" Id. at *17 ("It is more akin to the lewd and vulgar speech addressed in Fraser. It is also akin to the 
speech that promoted illegal actions in the M01"e case."). 
36 ld at *21-22 ("The facts that we are presented with establish much more of a connection between 
the off-campus action and on-campus effect. The website addresses the principal of the school. Its intended 
audience is students at the school. A paper copy of the website was brought into school, and the website was 
discussed in school. The picture on the profile was appropriated from the school district's website. Plaintiff 
crafted the profile out of anger at the principal for punishment the plaintiff had received at school for violat-
ing the dress code. J.S. lied in school to the principal about the creation of the imposter profile. Moreover, 
although a substantial disruption so as to fal1under Tinker did not occur, as discussed above, there was in fact 
some disruption during school hours. Additional1y, the profile was viewed at least by the principal at school 
and a paper copy of the profile was brought into school. On these facts, and because the lewd and vulgar 
off-campus speech had an effect on-campus, we find no error in the school administering discipline to J.S.") 
(citation omitted). 
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